The U.S. Navy has declared humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) operations as a core mission in support of the U.S. national security strategy. However little work has been done to illustrate which vessels are typically deployed for such operations or the costs of these deployments which, as contingencies, are not part of the regular defense budget. In this work we summarize some of the work that has been done in the area of cost analysis for U.S. Navy HADR operations and conclude with implications for policy makers.
Introduction
Natural disasters are increasingly affecting more people, resulting in higher costs (see Figure 1 ) (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, and Below 2014). All of this is happening as the world's population is growing and shifting to littoral regions. The scale of humanitarian disasters in 2013 was extraordinary and so was the resulting demand for international humanitarian response. The money expended in disaster relief in in 2013 was a record US$22 billion. Cost-effectiveness has not been a priority in any decision for responding to disasters ( Grieskpoor, Sondop, and Vos 1999) . A "send everything and we will figure out how to pay for it" approach has been the prevailing attitude of the United States Navy (USN) in the past ( Moffat 2014). The mission of HADR is not the sole responsibility of a single military Service. Geographic combatant commands (GCCs) within the U.S. Department of Defense are given responsibility for conducting military operations in specific regions of the world. The GCCs develop force structures to provide a HADR response when Keenan Yoho is the corresponding author. ©2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
requested by the Secretary of Defense and these often take the form of a joint task force ( Department of Defense (DoD) (2014), xi). The role of the joint task force (JTF) is to bring together the different military Services to focus on a specific operation and provide for clear command and control of operations until they are concluded. While each of the military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force) may be called to participate in a JTF, we focus here only on the expenditures of the Navy.
Since 2004, the USN has responded to many natural disaster events that have involved scores of deaths, millions of dollars in damages, and have taken years to rebuild. The USN has diverted ships from original missions 366 times for humanitarian assistance as opposed to 22 times for combat from the years 1979 to 2000, according to the fact sheets of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Center for Naval Analysis ( United States Naval Academy 2011). These humanitarian operations were most frequently conducted by one or two ships, not the substantial flotilla of ships that move large amounts of emergency supplies and aid the world has come to expect.
Responding to these disasters effectively requires planning as well as specialized resources, services, and capabilities. Among these are aviation assets. Such assets can conduct precision pick-up and drop-off of personnel and supplies. Amphibious landing vessels can move large quantities of supplies and relief personnel to affected areas in the littoral, and have the ability to establish triage, water and food distribution points quickly that can be secured with appropriate numbers of security forces.
Because of its global presence, as well as the considerable special capabilities that come from special types of vessels and skilled individuals on board their vessels ( Apte et al. 2013) , the USN has been both capable and willing to provide disaster relief. Since it is forward deployed at all times, the USN can and does provide a broad range of relief on short notice ( United States Navy 2015). This fact has not been lost on the international aid community, which notes "[b]esides having unmatched financial and military resources and a network of overseas military bases, the USA has an explicit policy of making its forces available for international humanitarian work" ( Wiharta et al. 2008, page x,) .
An important question is whether the USN will be able to continue and sustain humanitarian operations in an environment of fiscal austerity ( Apte et al. 2013; Roughead et al. 2013) . To answer this question, we need to better understand some of the important costs that are incurred during a disaster response. Currently, structured USN humanitarian operations suffer from many shortfalls ( Roughead et al. 2013 ) that includes a highly-regulated funding procedure separate from operations in direct support of war ( Apte and Heath 2011) .
Three responses to disaster events illustrate the range of capabilities brought to bear by the USN, as well as the types and magnitude of costs typical during such responses: 1) the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which decimated the coast of Sumatra, 2) the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and 3) the Tohoku earthquake in Japan in 2011. During each of these the USN committed unique assets and capabilities such as vertical lift, specialized personnel, and specialized equipment (to include hospital ships) ( Ures 2011; Greenfield and Ingram 2011; Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser 2012; Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya 2012; Roughead et al. 2013) .
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, as they are called by the USN, have become a significant part of the overall USN mission set. In 2007, the USN introduced its Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower which stressed the national security importance of having a flexible, responsive, and persistent naval surface force capability that included HADR in the Sea Services' core mission portfolio. Today, the HADR mission is considered one of the key areas of engagement and a critical operational mission performed by the USN ( Kaplan 2007) . In 2010, the DoD incorporated HADR into its Quadrennial Defense Review which is a legislatively-mandated review of DoD strategy and priorities. HADR was identified in the 2015 National Security Strategy as a core part of strengthening US national defense.
However, it is important to point out that the USN does not have a specific mission categorized for HADR and only diverts assets for these missions when they are available. Unfortunately, with no framework for costs of these operations the expense is poorly understood and can exceed even the best cost estimates quickly. The USN possesses an unmatched capability in vertical lift capacity which is often a critical need for HADR operations. However, in the face of budget constraints difficult decisions will have to be made with respect to trade-offs between HADR and other missions.
Many significant global challenges, such as global climate change and increasing population and population density, contribute to increased demand for humanitarian relief aid. However, given budget pressures and the likelihood that such missions could increase in the future due to the global challenges, such USN capabilities may not be so readily available in the future. With this in mind, we evaluate the rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate of the costs of such capabilities using data from three recent HADR operations. These give an understanding of the cost per day and the associated capabilities needed. They provide baseline data against which the costs per capabilities of a potential 'international relief flotilla' could be compared. A potential optimal flotilla consists of amphibious assault and transport dock ships because of their ability for search and rescue, aircraft and landing support, freshwater production, berthing capacity, and medical support ( Apte et al. 2013; Apte and Yoho 2014) . The reason for collecting this data is that given such a critical role played by the USN in the disaster relief world-wide, if for some reason, the USN reduces its involvement during disaster responses other national or international organizations will have some estimate of what will need to be filled in.
It is important to note that missions are funded through the regular military budget processes. HADR operations are funded as a contingency; such missions are sometimes funded from outside the regular budget or sometimes at the expense of other activities. However, few prior studies have inventoried the specific relief provided and even fewer have examined the costs. Our costs do not incorporate the opportunity cost associated with conducting a HADR mission versus training or another activity but our contribution to the research and policy literature is in summarizing the key cost analysis and cost estimation work of USN HADR operations. This analysis is not only of benefit to the USN but also other national military organizations and humanitarian organizations for the reasons stated earlier.
Literature Review
The existing humanitarian logistics literature comprises published works that address the topic from civilmilitary ( Balcik et al. 2010; Pettit and Beresford 2005) and operational and logistics ( Van Wassenhove 2006; Kovács and Spens 2007; Maon, Lindgreen, and Vanhamme 2009; Jahre, Jensen, and Listou 2009; Chandes and Paché 2010) perspectives. Numerous DoD publications, regulations, directives, and instructions also address ideal operational decision and financial management processes. However, to date, few published works report or estimate the cost of conducting military support for HADR. Grieskpoor, Sondop, and Vos (1999) examined excess mortality and costs of response by humanitarian organizations to identify cost-effectiveness in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Year. The case study in Sudan for visceral leishmaniasis (Dumdum or Black Fever) treatment was deemed to be 'very good value for money'. The authors conclude that more attempts need to be made to perform such analyses to inform the world about cost-effectiveness. More than a decade has passed since then. Given the recent addition of HADR as one of six expanded core capabilities for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard ( Department of the Navy (DoN) (2007)) we focus on the costs of humanitarian operations of the USN.
Over the last five years we have been involved in research and analysis of costs incurred by the USN to respond to natural disasters. Each of these projects utilized the HADR classification described by Apte (2009) based on speed of onset and geographical dispersion. Such classification helped the studies determine the disasters to be researched based on their characteristics. The studies collected and analyzed data on the scale and scope of the following disasters: 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami. The primary reasons for selection of these three disasters was because the United States Navy (USN) provided significant assistance and relief in each instance and the disasters offered enough similarity and difference to make interesting contrasts from a case perspective. Building upon the work by Ures (2011), Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) , and Moffat (2014), we investigate humanitarian missions completed by the USN in selected past disasters, summarize the findings and present new questions to the field of humanitarian and disaster response logistics as well as make some public policy recommendations.
Ures (2011) investigates humanitarian efforts supported by USN during 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2010 Haiti Earthquake and the 2010 Pakistan Floods. The fundamental questions addressed in this research are 1) whether it is possible to identify the major cost drivers for HADR operations, and 2) whether there is utility to fusing the disparate and materially different cost information that is required among the various functions of the DoD to create a better cost estimate? Ures (2011) uses data from the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) used by the DoD to estimate costs associated with HADR. The COST model is a multi-user costestimating tool that models the incremental cost of deployment in four main categories: personnel, personnel support, operations support, and transportation. It does not model procurement, munitions, military construction, force recapitalization or reset, working capital funds, security agreements for coalition support, counterimprovised explosive device/counter-drug operations, or force protection. It should be noted that the COST model was designed to estimate combat contingencies and not HADR operations. Ures (2011) also reports the actual costs submitted to the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) for reimbursement through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. The DSCA manages defense trade and arms transfers as well as defense institution building, international education, and training and HADR operational reimbursement.
The motivation for the work by Ures (2011) is that specific cost drivers have to be well understood if we are to accurately estimate costs associated with HADR operations. In this research, funding with a focus on the types and timing of expenditure is studied. The costs included fixed wing flight operations, helicopter flight operations, a hospital ship, overall surface ship operations and personnel costs. The estimated funding as well as reported funding costs for all the three disasters are given. Not all operational costs are covered for all disasters. Ures (2011) concludes that helicopter vertical lift will be most demanded yet expensive service for future disasters and that this capability needs to be provided for with sufficient scope and scale for effective relief. Ures (2011) also concludes that the hospital ship, unless it stays at the location long enough to justify the massive fixed cost, is more symbolic and often does not justify the deployment. A large-deck amphibious ship can, at a fraction of the cost, offer a better level of service and can arrive on station in less time. Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) follow the methodology and structure used by Ures (2011) , to include capturing data collected by the Navy to be submitted to OHDACA for reimbursement, and apply it to the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake in Japan. Their analysis advances the work of Ures (2011) in that it includes specific asset types that incurred the most operating costs. The motivation is to identify the cost drivers and asset types that will help USN determine the most cost-effective but capable resources. The authors describe reported funding for capabilities including flight operations, ship operations, infrastructure support and personnel. The costs, reported and reimbursed, are more focused on flight operations since large portion of the funding was used there. This capability helped with delivering support and supplies, search and rescue, and overall logistics. The highest costs for ships were fuel costs. They also conclude that helicopter vertical lift will be most needed yet costly service for future disasters.
Moffat (2014) examined the humanitarian response by USN for 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2010 Haiti Earthquake, and 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami using costs from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN vessels. The research analyzes the costs to examine which assets have the most capability for humanitarian assistance while being cost-effective. Moffat (2014) provides fuel and land operating costs for individual vessels that provided relief during the disasters. The author concludes that from the capability perspective vessels with landing helicopter deck and assault (LHD, LHA) and landing platform deck (LPD) were the most cost effective. High speed vessels, oilers, and destroyers (HSV, T-AO, DDG) without a helicopter aboard were not cost effective. The costs reported by Moffat (2014) include the cost of operating the vessel and the fuel costs for flight operations but did not specifically include recurring maintenance costs of the individual airframes.
To summarize, Ures (2011) looked at the costs of conducting HADR operations and consequently identified flight operations to be the most expensive. Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) extended the work of Ures (2011) by looking at specific asset types and identified flight operations as the most cost-effective and capable. Additionally, Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) identified fuel costs to be the highest for surface ship steaming operations. Moffat (2014) looked at costs from a capability viewpoint and identified vessels that were cost-effective and capable for humanitarian missions. Figure 2 summarizes the key literature on USN HADR costs and the cases studied in the key literature, respectively. For the purpose of our paper we focus on the costs associated with HADR operations for the 2004 tsunami, the Haiti earthquake of 2010 and the Japan Tohoku earthquake of 2011. We draw upon the work of the key research in the area by Ures (2011 ), Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012 ), and Moffat (2014 . Bringing together this research provides a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate of the costs necessary to sustain and carry forward to future disasters the level of effort provided by the USN during past HADR operations.
The Disasters Considered: Three Cases
We consider three disasters and their costs: 1) the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2) the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and 3) the Tohoku earthquake in Japan in 2011. The disasters selected have commonalities to the extent that they all originated in an earthquake deemed to be sudden onset but differ in certain aspects (see Apte 2009 for a full discussion). The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan in 2011 were sudden in their onset and dispersed over a wide region. The nuclear crisis evolved slowly in Japan. The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 was sudden in onset but relatively localized in its effects with the capital and largest city in the country -Port-au-Prince -being the worst affected.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004
On December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake of 9.1 magnitude struck off the west coast of the island of Sumatra in Indonesia. The earthquake was the second largest in recorded history as reported by the U.S. Geological Survey at the time. The event is commonly referred to as the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake by the scientific community and Operation Unified Response by the United States Department of Defense. The disaster spread throughout the Indian Ocean, causing deaths in 14 countries. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand were the hardest hit in terms of people lost and missing ( United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) (2005)). A year after the quake the estimated dead were numbered at 160,000 and there were more than 140,000 estimated as still missing ( Margesson 2005) .
One of the key lessons learned from this disaster was that money is not a panacea ( Heidtke 2007) . Massive quantities of food, medical supplies and water that were available could not be delivered to the affected population due to lack of means of distribution. The initial relief efforts were slow to build temporary shelters, resulting in millions of displaced persons over a nine-month period. This situation was further exacerbated by a lack of heavy equipment, rotary airlift, and ground logistical support during the reestablishment of habitat, sustenance, and infrastructure ( Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center (2005)). This logistical need for distribution of supplies, due to absence of prepositioning and compromised infrastructure, could have been mitigated through vertical lift of the supplies to the destination. Flight operations played a key role during the response.
Much of the aid provided by the USN came in the form of logistical services. Within just ten days of the disaster, the USN had 29 vessels deployed to the affected area that included 58 helicopters which by the 10th day had delivered over 610,000 pounds of food, water, and medical supplies ( Ures 2011; Greenfield and Ingram 2011; Elleman 2007) . Some areas, such as Ache, could be reached only by helicopter, and only the US military possessed the kind of helicopter lift capacity required on the scale necessary to meet the need ( Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006).
The Haiti Earthquake of 2010
In January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck southern Haiti from an epicenter ten miles southwest of the capital city, Port-au-Prince ( United States Geological Survey (USGS) (2010)). The resulting human and economic impact made this the worst natural disaster to strike the western hemisphere in recorded history ( Department of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010)). More than 100,000 structures collapsed ( United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010)) and approximately 222,570 persons were killed ( Holtzer, Eeri, and Savage 2013) . The number of persons affected has been estimated at 3 million with 1.5 million displaced ( United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2014)).
The immediate needs (during the first 100 h) were for heavy equipment for construction to restore some of the infrastructure, transportation vehicles, fuel, and mobile phones for communication ( Lockett and Obayuwana 2010) . United States Department of Defense had supply locations for their own needs in neighboring countries and the USN ships. Though the effort was considerable it could have been more timely. The relief was provided by the USN and other countries, especially the Dominican Republic. About 20 USN ships and United States Marine Corps provided numerous vertical lifts (14 fixed-wing aircrafts and 63 helicopters) to survey the damage, deliver the critical supplies and help in evacuation. The helicopter flight operations, again, played a key role due to devastated infrastructure in Haiti.
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan
In March 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami triggered overwhelming destruction and loss that resulted in an immediate global impact. The earthquake resulted in mass casualties, the majority of which happened in Iwate, Miyogi, and Fukushima. The tsunami that followed severely damaged the nuclear reactors at Fukushima resulting in nuclear crisis that caused many more problems in addition to disruption of utilities such as electricity and gas as well as water supply.
Over the course of the crisis, the United States and Japanese governments engaged in far-reaching cooperation, providing relief and aid to affected areas of northeast Japan ( Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet (C7F) (2012)). The response from the USN was swift. On the first day of the disaster one of the USN ships was on the scene and providing relief in the disaster zone. At the peak of the support the USN had 21 ships in the area providing sea and airlift transportation in conducting search and rescue operations, surveying the damage, logistical support and refueling assistance for Japanese aircrafts. Just as the response was prompt the entire operation was also terminated rapidly due to the desire of the US government in avoiding the impression of a permanent presence in the affected region ( Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya 2012) .
The Disasters and the Costs of Operations
The United States does not explicitly budget for contingency operations and only a small portion of the DoD budget goes towards the reimbursement of incremental costs associated with humanitarian operations. However, many costs are absorbed by general operating budgets and hence are not evident to the U.S. Congress when determining the true cost of conducting HADR operations ( Factor 2011). We summarize the reported incremental costs that were submitted by the USN for reimbursement by the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency through the OHDACA budget appropriation as well as the estimated operating costs of the ships that reported to the disaster area and operated on station as part of the USN disaster response. The incremental costs submitted for reimbursement by the USN during a disaster response include specific costs incurred during the disaster response such as additional supplies, reserve personnel called up to respond, and additional flight time outside of the time that might have normally been spent on operations and training.
Separate from the incremental costs are the basic operating costs associated with each ship deployed and on-station during the disaster response are those borne by having the ship operational each day. Drawing upon Moffat (2014) , and utilizing data from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN vessels, we have estimated the base operating costs associated with each vessel responding to the disaster. This estimated cost includes the fuel, personnel, and operating and maintenance costs of operating the vessel. The estimated cost does not include the days spend en route to the disaster location. Additionally, the estimated cost does not include the cost of actual flight operations but only the estimated fuel consumption used for flight operations during an average day. By reporting the costs submitted for reimbursement and the estimated ship operating costs we are better able to understand the range of the costs associated with the disaster response. If we considered only the incremental costs submitted for reimbursement, we would ignore the base operating costs associated with having the ship along with the costs of its fuel and maintenance and the costs of its basic crew.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004
Seven days after the earthquake, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with 17 embarked helicopters, was diverted from conducting a port visit in Hong Kong to the coast of northern Sumatra ( Elleman 2007) . The amphibious ship USS Bonhomme Richard, with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Group and 25 helicopters, arrived five days after the tsunami hit shore. The engagement by the DoD included 27 Navy ships, one Coast Guard cutter, 82 planes, 51 helicopters, and 15,000 personnel ( Elleman 2007) . The naval vessels operated as a sea base (see Button et al. 2007 and Tangredi 2011 for a full description of sea basing) for relief efforts for 40 days. They left the affected region only to be followed by the hospital ship USNS Mercy (see Figure 3) supported by helicopters from the amphibious assault ship USS Essex. The Mercy provided sea-based hospital services for 34 days. The USN deployed a total of 27 ships off the coast of Sumatra over the course of almost 50 days during its response to the tsunami (see Figure 4) . The incremental costs submitted by the USN are presented in Table 1 . No active duty personnel costs were included because the Navy considered them as "sunk" and not part of the variable or incremental costs of the tsunami operation itself. The only personnel costs included were those for reserve or temporary duty personnel called up to support the HADR operation. However, this perspective of personnel costs as "sunk" is inconsistent with the cost and expense practices of almost any other organization whether it be for-profit or non-profit. Though the USN currently considers the personnel costs to be "sunk" future work should explore these costs in more detail. In Figure 4 , we show the estimated cost of each vessel type by taking its average daily operating cost and multiplying it by the number of days on station. This estimated cost includes the fuel, personnel, and operating and maintenance costs of operating the vessel. It does not include the cost of actual flight operations, but only their estimated fuel consumption during an average day. A total of 27 ships and 14 different ship classes (e.g., amphibious assault ship, hospital ship, cruiser) responded to the aftermath of the tsunami. The estimated operating cost of all ships in the response is $129.1 million (see Figure 4) .
The 2010 Haiti Earthquake
The aid provided by the United States Government in fiscal year (FY) 2010 totaled $1.12 billion ( Ures 2011). Approximately $151 million in incremental costs (or $168 million in 2015 dollars) were submitted by the Navy for reimbursement (see Table 2 ). Within days of the earthquake, the USN provided 20 ships including one aircraft carrier, one hospital ship, and seven amphibious ships. The relief was provided by Marine Corps and various units for construction engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, mobile diving and salvage, underwater construction, medical, civil affairs, and others. The engagement from ship-and land-based aircraft was equally massive. Surveillance aircraft surveyed the damage caused by the earthquake. Fixed-wing planes helped with delivery of cargo to satisfy the demand and assisted in evacuations. Helicopters provided the vertical lift capacity critical to operating in an area without functioning infrastructure. The USN and US Marine Corps committed a total of 14 fixed-wing aircraft and 63 helicopters. A total of 29 ships and 17 different ship classes that responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake (see Figure 5 ). The hospital ship was on station for 49 days and a rescue and salvage ship operated in the area for 61 days. The total estimated cost, based upon the estimated cost per day, is approximately $128 million (see Figure 5 ). 
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan
The Tohoku earthquake resulted in over $200 billion in economic damage. The USN has approximately 70 ships, 300 various types of aircraft, and approximately 40,000 sailors and Marines operating in the region on any given day, providing a ready and capable presence. There were 16 USN ships and 8 Military Sealift ships provided disaster relief in and around the affected coastal areas of Japan in support of Operation Tomodachi which took place from April 12 to May 4, 2011. Military Sealift ships were engaged in relief supply transfer to responding USN ships. The ships engaged in operations such as search and rescue, relief supply delivery on shore, and aircraft refueling operations. All services from DoD assisted with medical supplies and services, communications, relief supply, and civil engineering.
Operation Tomadachi took place from March 4, 2011 until May 4, 2011. The United States Pacific Command estimated total costs incurred from March 12 through June 30, 2011 to be approximately $2.89 billion in 2015 dollars (see Table 3 ). These costs included the cost of moving personnel (to include DoD civilians) into and within the region ($8.7 million), reserve and temporary duty personnel support costs for those called up specifically for the disaster response ($334.9 million), humanitarian relief support which included specific infrastructure and supply costs ($297.4 million) and operating support costs which include ship steaming days and flying hour costs which make up the largest part of the total costs (approximately $2.25 billion). The total costs to the USN for being on-scene are quite different. Though the specific costs allocated to Operation Tomadachi were approximately $2.89 billion (in 2015 dollars), the operational and fuel costs necessary to keep Navy vessels loitering in the area in case further assistance was necessary were also substantial. Taking data from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs Center (VMOSC) we have daily dollar figures (in 2015 dollars) for each vessel that were in the vicinity of Operation Tomadachi either conducting active operations or standing by in case needed (see Figure 6 ). There were 23 ships (and 12 vessel classes) that responded to the Tohoku earthquake. The estimated operating costs were approximately $100.4 million. 
Conclusion
We have reported the incremental and estimated daily operating costs incurred by the USN for three different sudden onset natural disasters (see Figure 7) . The incremental costs were only those incurred as a direct result of the disaster and submitted for reimbursement through the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. To capture the base operating costs, we used data from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN vessels. Our work explores the cost of operations from a budgetary perspective with no consideration for societal and cultural issues which is a limitation of our contribution. However, enumerating opportunity costs and accounting for them in view of efficacy in the scenario-based environment is something that may have to be explored in future studies of HADR cost models. The base operating costs for the vessels responding to all three of the disaster cases presented are remarkably similar. The "basic response package" or number and mix of vessels were similar (see Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 ). The most significant cost differentiator was in the incremental costs incurred for each disaster case. Figure 7 shows that the USN spent substantially more in Japan. This may be explained first by the fact that the USN had many assets in the area at the time of the disaster and therefore all were utilized. Second, Japan is a close ally of the United States and this, coupled with the fact that there are many U.S. civilians and military personnel there, results in the U.S. treating the disaster almost as if it occurred in the homeland. Finally, though the disaster started with earthquake it resulted in a tsunami that triggered a nuclear catastrophe. This complex disaster event became a crisis that demanded a significant amount of relief and sustaining support which resulted in high costs.
The USN is only one of the major relief providers responding to disasters around the world ( Moroney et al. 2013 ). However, it brings specialized capabilities in response to disasters that few other organizations can provide. As the United States scales back and focuses its military investments, the USN is not certain it will have the same capabilities in the future that it has brought to bear in the past. Having an idea of the potential costs that may need to be borne by other organizations and/or nations will be useful when thinking about a collective response to future disasters. Furthermore, future relief efforts would benefit from an understanding of the comparative capabilities and competencies of all the organizations and agencies that respond to disasters as well as their level of interoperability ( Apte and Yoho 2011; Moroney et al. 2013) . The integration of USN capabilities with other partners worldwide could be a longer-term solution and pathway to ensuring the necessary capabilities and capacity are maintained to deliver effective humanitarian and disaster aid ( Roughead et al. 2013) .
Given that our perspective of the cost-model is about incremental cost, it may be worth noting that this model will shed better light on HADR provided by USN by considering set-up/sunk/up-front costs that could be used for strategic as well as operational prepositioning ( Apte 2014 ) such as HADR-pack-up-kits or the demand estimating drones. Such prepositioning is cost effective as the United Nations (2007) and the World Meteorological Organization (2009) estimate that every dollar invested in preparing for a disaster saves seven dollars in disaster response.
To improve communication, coordination, and cooperation, one necessary piece of information is to understand the specialized capabilities of each of the players and the costs of providing those operations during a disaster response ( Moroney et al. 2013) . As the United States cuts back its defense spending there may be shortfalls in support provided to disasters and these costs provide estimates to planners inside other nations, the United Nations, ASEAN, NATO and other alliances and organizations that may wish to fill the potential gaps. We have shown both the incremental and baseline costs incurred by the USN for three specific, rapid onset disasters and these costs may be a useful benchmark for determining the appropriate international relief flotilla necessary to develop in the future as well as where there may be opportunities to gain greater economic efficiency in disaster response.
We would like to point out that based on the costs discussed here, in the future, the expensive yet critical vertical lift operations for needs assessment can be replaced with the discoveries in technology. For example, drones could be deployed for damage assessment to answer 'where, what and when' questions for demand estimation. Another possibility is the strategic prepositioning ( Apte 2014) for the infrastructure, physical and social, in addition to contingency planning. A smart way to utilize limited budget is to develop and fulfill readiness metrics for HADR missions.
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